Tools reference
The Maetra MCP server exposes a capability-dependent tool set. Call tools/list to discover the tools available to the current workspace and API key.
Invoke a tool with tools/call:
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 10,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "check_task_alignment",
"arguments": {
"mcp_access_token": "<token from get_mcp_access>",
"session_ref": "conversation_01JY8Q",
"action": "Edit the refund approval route"
}
}
}
Access preflight#
get_mcp_access
Required first call for every new user turn or work cycle, after context compaction or restart, and whenever Maetra requests an access refresh. No arguments.
The response contains:
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
workspace | Workspace ID, MCP enabled state, and configuration version. |
capabilities | Enabled state, reason, and allowed tools for Secure, Govern, and Task Guard. |
required_behavior | Runtime instructions the host must follow. |
mcp_access_token | Short-lived token required by every capability tool. |
expires_at | Access-token expiry. |
{
"name": "get_mcp_access",
"arguments": {}
}
Note Every tool below requires an additional string argument,
mcp_access_token, containing the current token returned byget_mcp_access.
Task Guard tools#
start_task
Start or transition to the current user-authorized Task Guard task.
| Argument | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
session_ref | string | ✓ | Stable host conversation or session reference. |
objective | string | ✓ | The direct user's current objective. |
idempotency_key | string | ✓ | Stable retry key for the task start. |
title | string | Short task title. | |
agent_name / agent_id | string | Agent identity. | |
constraints, decisions | string[] | User constraints and agreed decisions. | |
success_criteria | string[] | Observable completion conditions. | |
in_scope, out_of_scope | string[] | Explicit task boundaries. | |
open_questions | string[] | Unresolved questions. | |
direct_user_event_id | string | Required for a later task or contract revision in the same session. | |
host_type | string | CODEX, CLAUDE, CUSTOM_MCP, or CUSTOM_API. | |
integration_mode | string | ADVISORY or ENFORCED. | |
confirmation_capable | boolean | Whether the host can ask the session user inline. | |
effect_reporting_capable | boolean | Whether the host can report actual effects. |
After starting, retain task.id, contract_version, and the returned anchor.
get_task_context
Retrieve the active Task Guard contract after turn start, compaction, restart, or when context may be stale.
| Argument | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
session_ref | string | ✓ |
check_task_alignment
Check a proposed material action against the active task before executing it.
| Argument | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
session_ref | string | ✓ | Stable session reference. |
action | string | ✓ | Concise proposed action. |
action_type | string | Category such as edit, read, send, create, or execute. | |
target | string | File, system, person, artifact, or other target. | |
effects | string[] | Expected direct and connected effects. | |
rationale | string | Why the action supports the task. | |
current_step | string | Current task step. | |
contract_version | number | Last contract version fetched by the host. | |
external_action_id | string | Stable host action ID used to bind effect reporting. | |
idempotency_key | string | Stable retry key. | |
effect | string | READ, SEARCH, CREATE, MODIFY, DELETE, COMMUNICATE, PUBLISH, EXECUTE, PURCHASE, TRANSFER, GRANT_ACCESS, REVOKE_ACCESS, MOVE_DATA, SCHEDULE, or OTHER. | |
tool_name, operation | string | Tool and operation being checked. | |
resource, destination | object | Structured target and destination metadata. | |
data_classes | string[] | Data classifications involved. | |
reversible | boolean | Whether the action can be undone. | |
estimated_cost | number | Estimated monetary cost. | |
provenance | string | HOST_VERIFIED, TOOL_ADAPTER_VERIFIED, CONNECTOR_VERIFIED, AGENT_ASSERTED, or UNVERIFIED. | |
claimed_relationship | string | How the action supports the task: DIRECT, REQUIRED_DEPENDENCY, COMPATIBILITY_REPAIR, VERIFICATION, SUPPORTING_RESEARCH, SUPPORTING_COORDINATION, INCIDENTAL_CLEANUP, OPTIONAL_IMPROVEMENT, OBJECTIVE_CHANGE, UNRELATED, or UNKNOWN. |
Follow the returned verdict and next_action exactly. See Alignment verdicts.
explain_task_relationship
Provide bounded evidence when check_task_alignment returns NEEDS_EXPLANATION.
| Argument | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
check_id | string | ✓ |
relationship | string | ✓ |
evidence | string[] |
The response is a new alignment decision. Follow its verdict.
record_task_progress
Record a compact milestone for the active task.
| Argument | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
session_ref | string | ✓ |
summary | string | ✓ |
idempotency_key | string | ✓ |
completed, next_steps | string[] | |
new_dependencies, open_questions | string[] | |
current_step | string |
Check every new_dependencies item with check_task_alignment before acting on it.
record_action_effect
Report what a previously checked action actually changed.
| Argument | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
check_id | string | ✓ |
actual_effects | string[] | ✓ |
actual_effect | string | |
affected_resources | object[] | |
result_reference, artifact_hash | string | |
summary, validation_outcome | string |
If effect_aligned is false, stop expanding the work and ask the session user inline.
complete_task
Complete the active Task Guard task when the objective and success criteria are satisfied.
| Argument | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
session_ref | string | ✓ |
summary | string | ✓ |
completion_event_id | string | ✓ |
Secure tools#
check_action
Scan an AI-agent prompt, tool call, or output with Maetra Secure. Backs POST /v1/secure/scan.
| Argument | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
content | string | ✓ | Prompt, tool payload, or output to scan. |
scan_type | string | prompt_input (default), tool_call, or output. | |
tool_name | string | ✓ if tool_call | Tool being called. |
agent_id, agent_name | string | Agent identity. | |
context | object | Structured context. |
Honor safe, flagged, or blocked before continuing.
list_active_rules
List active Secure rules. No arguments beyond mcp_access_token.
create_rule
Create a Secure rule. New rules default to draft.
| Argument | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
name | string | ✓ | Rule name. |
type | string | ✓ | data_pattern, policy_dsl, prompt_pattern, or tool_call. |
action | string | block, flag, or log. | |
severity | string | critical, high, medium, or low. | |
status | string | active, archived, or draft. | |
applies_to_all | boolean | Defaults to true. | |
data_direction | string | inbound, outbound, or both. | |
custom_patterns, tool_names, data_categories, data_descriptions, dsl_statements, pattern_library_ids, agent_ids | string[] | Rule-specific values. |
update_rule
Update an existing Secure rule by ID. id is required; every create-rule field is optional and only submitted fields change.
Govern tools#
request_approval
Request a Govern checkpoint before a consequential action. Backs POST /v1/checkpoints.
| Argument | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
action | string | ✓ | Action name. |
payload | object | Structured action details. | |
agent_id, agent_name | string | Agent identity. | |
context, reasoning | string | Reviewer context and agent reasoning. | |
autonomy_level | string | L0–L5. | |
policy_ids, policy_group_ids | string[] | Restrict evaluation. | |
timeout_seconds | number | Wall-clock ceiling for a human decision. | |
idempotency_key | string | Stable retry key for creating the checkpoint. | |
target | object | Exact account, resource, destination, or external system. Required for execution authorization. | |
task_authorization | object | Task authority containing task_id, revision_id, and external_action_id. Required for execution authorization. | |
runtime | object | Versioned tool or model identity. Required for execution authorization. | |
executor_audience | string | Intended executor identity. Defaults to maetra-executor. |
If the response is pending, continue polling with get_approval_status. An approved response is the decision; call authorize_execution immediately before the external action to consume that approval once.
An approved response includes the signed decisionToken, canonical actionEnvelope, actionEnvelopeHash, policyDigest, exact policyVersions, token lifecycle timestamps, and the expected execution and effect deadlines. Maetra carries these fields into the MCP execution tools automatically when you provide the checkpoint ID.
get_approval_status
Long-poll a Govern checkpoint.
| Argument | Type | Required |
|---|---|---|
checkpoint_id | string | ✓ |
wait_seconds | number |
Poll until approved, rejected, expired, blocked, or cancelled.
list_active_policies
List active Govern policies, including whether each uses exact rules or decision intelligence. No arguments beyond mcp_access_token.
authorize_execution
Consume an approved decision capability once, immediately before the exact provider request. Maetra reloads the checkpoint, verifies its signed decision and canonical action envelope, and creates a signed execution receipt.
| Argument | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
checkpoint_id | string | ✓ | Approved checkpoint returned by request_approval. |
idempotency_key | string | ✓ | Stable key for this exact execution. An identical retry returns the existing authorization. |
provider | string | ✓ | External provider or system receiving the request. |
operation | string | ✓ | Provider operation, such as refunds.create. |
request | JSON | ✓ | Normalized downstream request that will be sent after authorization. |
Do not call the provider first. A changed request, wrong executor, expired or revoked decision, or second independent use fails. Provider retries remain possible under the returned executionId.
record_execution_attempt
Append one immutable provider attempt to the authorized execution. Record successes, failures, timeouts, and retries against the same execution_id.
| Argument | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
execution_id | string | ✓ | ID returned by authorize_execution. |
attempt_number | number | ✓ | Positive attempt sequence, starting at 1. |
request | JSON | ✓ | Request sent for this provider attempt. |
response | JSON | Provider response, when available. | |
status | string | ✓ | succeeded, failed, or unknown. |
started_at | string | ✓ | ISO 8601 provider-start time. |
completed_at | string | ISO 8601 completion time, when known. | |
provider_status, provider_transaction_id, error_class | string | Provider reconciliation details. |
A failed or unknown attempt does not consume another decision. Retry only the identical authorized action, then record the next attempt number.
record_execution_effect
Append the state observed after execution. This connects the approved action and provider attempt to what actually changed.
| Argument | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
execution_id | string | ✓ | Authorized execution being verified. |
observation | JSON | ✓ | External state observed after execution. |
observed_at | string | ✓ | ISO 8601 observation time. |
verification_method | string | ✓ | provider_signed, ledger_readback, hardware_attested, stake_backed, task_guard, or self_reported. |
verification_status | string | verified, mismatch, or unverified; defaults to unverified. | |
proof | JSON | Method-specific proof. | |
provider, external_reference, task_guard_effect_report_id | string | Reconciliation links. |
Self-reported observations remain labelled unverified. Independent verification methods require their configured verifier to validate the proof; the caller cannot turn an unverified observation into a verified receipt by setting a boolean.
Ordering multiple controls#
For the same material action:
- Call
check_task_alignmentwhen Task Guard is enabled. - Call
check_actionbefore processing untrusted content or executing the tool call. - Call
request_approvalbefore the external action when Govern is enabled. - Poll until the decision is terminal; stop unless it is approved.
- Call
authorize_executionimmediately before the exact provider request. - Execute only after authorization succeeds, then call
record_execution_attemptfor every provider attempt. - Call
record_execution_effectwith the resulting observed state. - Call
record_action_effectwhen Task Guard effect reporting is enabled.
Task Guard inline confirmation does not replace Govern approval, and Govern approval does not replace one-use execution authorization.